Countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents through intersectoral cooperation: an interview with Cornelius Bartels

Cornelius Bartels works for the Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Medical Emergency Management in Germany. He previously worked at ECDC, where he led the Centre’s activities in biopreparedness and biosecurity.

What is the definition of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) event, and can you give some examples where such events have taken place in the past?

CBRN events are characterised by accidental or deliberate release of chemical, biological or radio-nuclear agents, including ionising radiation, potentially posing a threat to health or to the environment. However, a more precise definition will always depend on the perspective and mandate of the institutions involved.

Chemical agents: The repeated release of sarin, which is a chemical weapon or nerve agent, and chlorine gas were used by government forces against insurgents and the civilian population during the civil war in Syria from 2013 onwards.

In 1979, there was an accidental release of a large quantities of ‘weaponised’ (purified and aerosolised) anthrax spores from a major bioweapons production plant in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union. The incident caused 68 documented fatalities.

Then we had an example of the deliberate use of radio-nuclear agents when the former Russian intelligence officer and dissident Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with an extreme dose of Polonium 210 in London in 2006. Litvinenko rapidly developed a severe ‘acute radiation syndrome’ and eventually passed away 22 days after the poisoning in a London hospital.

Who are the key players that should be involved in intersectoral workplace cooperation in fighting CBRN events?

CBRN incidents stemming from deliberate releases – including the anthrax mail attacks in the United States in 2001 and attacks in the Tokyo subway in 1995 – suggest that a joint response by police authorities and public health services at an early stage is advantageous. Depending on the nature of an incident, many other sectors, such as agriculture, veterinary medicine, laboratories, border control or civil protection, might also be relevant to involve in the response. 

Regarding large-scale emergencies, the establishment of a functional civil-military cooperation framework will significantly improve the effectiveness of response measures. 

The cutting-edge approach consists of exploring and establishing intersectoral cooperation assets already in ‘peacetime’ during the preparedness planning stage.

Which potential CBRN treats are we facing today, and which steps can we take to counter the deliberate releases of CBRN agents?

Anticipating and preventing threats from deliberate releases of CBRN agents will always require a well-established culture of information exchange with the players in law enforcement and it should be based on regular threat assessments. 

Accidental releases can be prevented by regularly carrying out systematic risk and hazard analyses. Foresight methods and ‘horizon-scanning’ are essential elements in today’s state-of-the-art incident anticipation. Investing in strong risk communication procedures is also an essential element in CBRN preparedness planning. 

Finally, it is important to emphasise and consider the increasing role of state actors when it comes to CBRN threats. The difference between state-actors and non-state actors can often be blurred. ‘Low-tech’ plots are considered more likely to occur. At the same time, effective sophistication and weaponisation of CBRN agents still present a high threshold. 

How can countries in the EU’s neighbouring regions improve and optimise their collaboration in this field?

One key lies in following a regional approach instead of thinking as individual countries. Most CBRN incidents are prone to developing a cross-border dimension. Therefore, countries should reach out to neighbouring countries for synergies and cross-border preparedness planning (e.g. complementary stockpiling of CBRN medical countermeasures). Sharing insights while participating in transnational trainings and simulation exercises will also add enormous value to national emergency preparedness.