



# Operational considerations for influenza surveillance in the WHO European Region during COVID-19: interim guidance

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## Key messages

#### For sentinel primary care influenza surveillance:

- It is important to maintain existing influenza-like illness (ILI) and acute respiratory infection (ARI)case definitions, where possible.
- When the number of cases presenting to sentinel surveillance sites is low, all patients meeting the case definition for ILI or ARI should be sampled.
- Sampled patients meeting the ILI or ARI case definition should ideally be tested concurrently for influenza and SARS-CoV-2 viruses.
- Epidemiological data on ILI should continue to be collected.
- Perform subtyping/lineage determination for all influenza-positive specimens.
- Where sentinel primary care surveillance for influenza has been disrupted because of COVID-19 testing strategies, explore alternative approaches such as patient self-sampling and the utility of telephone consultation syndromic data.

#### For non-sentinel surveillance:

- Non-sentinel specimens from primary and secondary care should be prioritized for COVID-19 testing; in addition, influenza testing should be performed in parallel for people at risk of developing severe disease (the elderly and those with underlying diseases).
- A random sample of all patients in these settings could be considered for influenza testing, based on clinical judgement and the level of influenza circulation, including further genetic and/or antigenic characterisation and antiviral resistance testing at national influenza centres or reference laboratories.

#### For hospital influenza surveillance:

- Important to maintain existing SARI case definition, where possible
- Test and report all SARI cases for influenza and SARS-CoV-2 simultaneously, where possible when influenza is known to be circulating

#### Laboratory considerations:

- Sequence a representative subset of influenza and SARS-CoV-2 viruses (date, geographical region, age, severity).
- Share a representative subset of influenza-positive specimens with national influenza centres or reference laboratories.
- At least 10% of the influenza viruses, or all when low circulation observed, should be characterised genetically and/or antigenically.
- At least 10% of the influenza viruses, or all when low circulation observed, should be tested (phenotypically and/or genotypically) for antiviral resistance

## Background

Since 2014, influenza surveillance in Europe has been jointly coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) [1-3]. In the European Union (EU), the surveillance of influenza is conducted according to the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 1082/2013 and (EU) 2018/945 [4-6]. For WHO, the surveillance of influenza is conducted based on the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness [7] framework and terms of reference for National Influenza Centers (NICs) and the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) [8].

In 2020, the WHO European Region has experienced widespread community transmission of COVID-19. In response, countries have implemented extensive public health and societal measures to slow its transmission. A range of surveillance systems are in place to monitor the progression and evolution of COVID-19 throughout the course of the pandemic [9]. These include a mix of syndromic and laboratory-based data collection systems, some of which are based on existing established influenza surveillance frameworks.

The case definitions used to monitor influenza in primary care (influenza-like illness [ILI] or acute respiratory infection [ARI]) and hospital settings (severe acute respiratory infection [SARI]) substantially overlap with those for COVID-19 [6]. This potentially enables influenza surveillance systems to fulfil selected surveillance objectives for COVID-19 in addition to influenza [10,11]. However, the functioning of these systems was affected at the end of the 2019–2020 season due to national interventions and healthcare reprioritisation for COVID-19. Some 75% of Member States in the WHO European Region who responded to ECDC and WHO surveys (n=32) reported that there was a national recommendation for the population not to visit their general practitioners regarding COVID-19. Similarly, the changes in the use of hospitals has made an impact on sentinel SARI surveillance (unpublished data, ECDC and WHO). More detail on the Regional surveillance and national surveillance systems can be found on the websites of ECDC and WHO Regional Office for Europe [12-14].

## **Purpose of the document**

This document outlines operational considerations for how to support the continuity of national influenza surveillance systems and public health laboratories for the epidemiological and virological surveillance for influenza in the 2020–2021 season during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, it describes how these systems might be used to contribute to COVID-19 surveillance.

The intended audience for this document is those with national responsibility for influenza and/or COVID-19 surveillance.

## **Common objectives of influenza and COVID-19 surveillance**

Common objectives for influenza and COVID-19 surveillance in the WHO European Region are to:

- monitor the timing, geographic spread, intensity of transmission and severity over time of SARS-CoV-2, influenza and other respiratory viruses;
- inform hospital preparedness and appropriate mitigation measures such as vaccination or antiviral treatment for seasonal influenza;
- monitor characteristics of circulating influenza and SARS-CoV-2 viruses to inform treatment, drug and vaccine development;
- assess the impact on health systems;
- assess the impact of public health interventions.

## **Operational considerations for influenza surveillance during COVID-19**

#### Sentinel primary care surveillance

Sentinel surveillance of influenza in primary care is conducted by representative national networks of primary care practitioners, covering typically 1-6% of the population [12]. It relies on the use of syndromic case definitions for ILI and/or ARI. An advantage of the continued use of sentinel influenza surveillance systems for influenza but now also including COVID-19 is that robust epidemiological data are routinely collected in systematic, standardized approaches. In addition, data can be compared with historical data that were collected in similar ways and thereby allow for reliable analysis and be used as basis for the assessment of impact. Standardised approaches to testing are employed in these systems, which should limit the impact of changes in national testing strategies that affect other COVID-19 surveillance approaches [15].

Determining optimal thresholds for sensitivity and specificity for the ILI case definition is always a balance based on the needs and objectives of surveillance for influenza, COVID-19 and other respiratory infections with similar and non-discriminatory clinical characteristics [16]. As the COVID-19 clinical spectrum does not always include high temperature, systematic sampling from ARI cases, where this case definition is already in use, may be considered as a more sensitive approach to capture both COVID-19 and influenza in sentinel surveillance than ILI. A substantial number of countries already have monitoring systems based on ARI in place; of 53 countries reporting influenza data in the Region, 29 report ILI and ARI consultations, 21 report ILI consultations only, two report ARI consultations only and one reports neither ILI nor ARI consultations [2,12].

Countries are encouraged to continue to collect the number of consultations from patients based on existing ILI case definitions. An expansion to report ARI consultation from existing systems could be considered. An increase in the number of participating practitioners in sentinel surveillance could also be considered but this would be challenging, especially during a pandemic, given the difficulties involved in setting up and maintaining new sites, training staff and ensuring good quality data from these sites. Using thresholds based on historical ILI/ARI consultation data for defining the start of the influenza season might be compromised by changes in health-seeking behaviour (e.g. supplementing or replacing physical GP visits with telephone or video consultations) or the expansion of the number of reporting sentinel physicians, and should be used with caution.

Outside of the influenza season, sentinel ILI and/or ARI surveillance data might be a good proxy for the incidence of COVID-19 when the proportion of SARS-CoV-2-positive sentinel specimens is high. When multiple respiratory viruses (e.g. SARS-CoV-2, influenza, RSV) are co-circulating, data from sentinel syndromic surveillance needs to be combined with the results of the virological testing to understand the contribution of the viruses in the consultation rates in primary care. Sentinel syndromic surveillance of ILI and/or ARI and reporting to ECDC and WHO via The European Surveillance System (TESSy) hosted at ECDC should continue throughout the year.

In the past, a subset of patients with ILI or ARI in sentinel primary care practices were swabbed and specimens sent to national influenza centres (NICs) or reference laboratories for virological testing and further genetic and antigenic virus characterisation. During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic period, when the number of cases presenting to sentinel surveillance sites are low, all patients with ILI or ARI symptoms in sentinel primary care should ideally be sampled and tested concurrently for influenza and SARS-CoV-2 viruses; a multiplex RT-PCR assay can be considered. If the laboratories do not have sufficient capacity to test all specimens, a subset of specimens should be sent to NICs, as in previous years, while the diagnosis of the additional specimens should be performed in other primary care. Where this is not possible, testing should be sequential, with SARS-CoV-2-negative specimens, or a subset there of, tested for influenza viruses.

During previous influenza seasons, NICs were asked to subtype/lineage determine all influenza-positive sentinel detections and characterise genetically and/or antigenically a representative subset of influenza viruses of 10%. Should lower numbers of influenza viruses than in previous years circulate, all influenza-positive viruses should be characterised in addition to subtyping/lineage determination. Antiviral resistance testing (genotypic and/or phenotypic) should also be performed for all, or at least a subset of influenza viruses. At the minimum, a representative subset should be further characterised at the NICs and sent to WHO Collaborating Centre in London. SARS-CoV-2-positive viruses should also be further analysed by sequencing at the national laboratories or at a WHO referral laboratory. Testing for other respiratory viruses should be based on available capacities. The storage of clinical specimens at the site of collection and transport to the testing laboratory should follow the WHO manual for laboratory diagnosis for influenza and WHO guidance for laboratory testing for COVID-19 [17,18].

The redirection of patients presenting with ILI or ARI to COVID-19-specific testing centres instead of primary care is likely to disrupt primary care influenza surveillance in many countries in the Region. In these scenarios, a randomly selected subset of these specimens should be redistributed to the NICs for influenza diagnostic, subtyping/lineage determination and further virus characterisation and antiviral susceptibility analysis.

#### **Non-sentinel surveillance**

Non-sentinel specimens from primary and secondary care should be prioritized for COVID-19 testing. Influenza testing could be performed in parallel to SARS-CoV-2 for a random sample of all patients with ILI or ARI when testing capacities allow, there is evidence of influenza circulation and if few influenza viruses are being identified through sentinel surveillance. People in risk groups or elderly people with increased risk to develop severe disease progression when infected with influenza and based on clinical judgement to initiate early antiviral treatment could also be prioritized for influenza testing.

Influenza-positive specimens should be made available to NICs or reference laboratories for further virus genetic and/or antigenic characterisation and antiviral resistance testing. When capacity allows, testing of samples for other respiratory viruses (e.g. RSV) should be considered based on clinical judgement.

#### **Hospital surveillance**

Countries vary in their hospital surveillance approaches, with sentinel SARI surveillance implemented mainly in the Eastern part of the Region, while EU/EEA countries have been conducting hospital surveillance based on laboratory-confirmed hospitalized and/or ICU-admitted influenza cases. In some countries, there is comprehensive SARI surveillance

During the COVID-19 pandemic, more countries have implemented sentinel SARI surveillance with subsequent laboratory testing of all SARI patients for SARS-CoV-2. When there is evidence of influenza circulation from primary care surveillance systems, all SARI cases in sentinel sites should ideally be tested simultaneously for influenza and SARS-CoV-2. However, when this is not possible due to limited testing capacity, sequential testing may be considered with influenza testing following a SARS-CoV-2 negative test. Based on clinical judgement antiviral treatment for influenza should be empirical pending either simultaneous or consecutive testing results.

The reporting of either case-based or aggregate SARI or laboratory-based data for influenza and COVID-19 to TESSy and WHO should continue as in previous seasons.

### **Qualitative indicators**

Qualitative indicators to assess the level of geographic spread and intensity utilising primary care data are established for influenza, but not for COVID-19. However, within its Pandemic Influenza Severity Assessment (PISA) work, WHO has suggested a set of qualitative indicators, and work is ongoing to adapt these indicators to include a more general respiratory syndromic and COVID-19-specific indicator [19]. The implementation of PISA indicators might help to assess the pandemic situation in a simplified way.

#### **Operational laboratory considerations**

A subset of influenza-positive specimens from sentinel and other (non-sentinel) sources, including hospitalised patients, should be shared with NICs to perform more in-depth virus characterization analysis, which includes the assessment of antiviral susceptibility, as well as antigenic and genetic characterisation. In order to ensure that a sufficient number of influenza viruses that represent circulating strains in countries are shared with WHO to inform the bi-annual vaccine composition meeting, it is important that national influenza laboratories

continue to perform virus culture (BSL2 for SARS-CoV-2-negative, influenza-positive specimens) and ship influenza viruses and clinical specimens from positive specimens to WHO Collaborating Centre according to existing WHO guidance [20,21].

Continuity in the monitoring of influenza and SARS-CoV-2 virus evolution through the sequencing of representative viruses is essential for monitoring changes in the viruses. WHO guidance for SARS-CoV-2 is under development and will be published separately. Sequence data from SARS-CoV-2 and influenza virus samples should be shared through GISAID [22].

## **Plans for updating**

ECDC and WHO Regional Office for Europe continue to monitor the situation closely for any changes that may affect this interim guidance. Should any factors change, ECDC and WHO Regional Office for Europe will issue a further update.

## Contributors

Technical advisors from WHO (James Fielding, Piers Mook, Mark Muscat and Richard Pebody) and ECDC staff (Cornelia Adlhoch, Bruno Ciancio, Angeliki Melidou and Gianfranco Spiteri).

## **Declaration of interests**

There are no conflicts of interest.

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