Epidemiological update: A(H7N9) influenza virus, China, 19 December 2013
In March 2013, Chinese authorities announced the identification of a novel reassortant A(H7N9) avian influenza virus in patients in eastern China.
Epidemiological update: avian influenza A(H5N1), 8 January 2014
On 8 January 2014, Canada reported a fatal imported case of influenza A(H5N1) infection. This is the first confirmed human case of H5N1 in North America.
Epidemiological update A(H7N9) influenza, 6 February 2014
In March 2013, Chinese authorities announced the identification of a novel reassortant A(H7N9) influenza virus in patients in eastern China. Since then, human cases have continued to be reported, and as of 7 February 2014 (Figure 1), there have been 308 laboratory-confirmed cases: Zhejiang (122), Guangdong (54), Shanghai (42), Jiangsu (36), Fujian (19), Hunan (7), Jiangxi (5), Henan (4), Anhui (4) ,Beijing (3), Shandong (2), Hebei (1), Guangxi (2), Guizhou (1), Hong Kong (4) and Taiwan (2). In addition, the virus has been detected in one asymptomatic case in Beijing.
Very low public health threat related to outbreak of avian influenza A(H5N8) in turkeys in Germany
The risk of transmission of avian influenza A(H5N8) to the general public in the EU/EEA countries is extremely low.
Epidemiological update: increase in reporting of human cases of A(H5N1) influenza, Egypt, 9 April 2015
Epidemiological update: increase in reporting of human cases of A(H5N1) influenza, Egypt
Rapid risk assessment: Potential resurgence of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza
The increased reports of A(H5N1) outbreaks in poultry and wild bird populations, and the emergence of a further evolved lineage of the virus in poultry in some countries, do not change the current assessment of the risk to human health.
Rapid risk assessment: A(H5N1) Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Egypt – Implications for human health in Europe
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) infections are continuing to occur in poultry and humans in Egypt. However there is no evidence of a significant change in the pattern of human illness and deaths related to A(H5N1) virus infections in the country. Certainly there are no epidemiological data or analyses consistent with adaptation of these viruses to humans.
Rapid risk assessment: Human fatality from highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in Guangdong province, China
Following reports of a human fatality due to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in China’s Guangdong province, the European Commission requested an update to the assessment of risk of human-to-human transmission occurring. ECDC does not consider that there is any change to the previous assessments that the risk for EU/EEA countries is very low.
Risk assessment: Laboratory-created A(H5N1) viruses transmissible between ferrets
The results of two, as yet unpublished, investigations of laboratory-induced genetic changes in avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have been reported to have found that a surprisingly few number of changes make the viruses transmissible between ferrets, the most commonly used model for the way influenza behaves in humans. The possibility that this could have resulted in the development in laboratories of A(H5N1) influenza viruses transmissible between humans has caused concern for public safety and generated unusually high levels of debate in the scientific community. This report summarises and explains the complex public health and scientific issues around these developments including the positive and negative aspects of some of the responses that have been proposed internationally.